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RECENT CASES
TWO CIRCUIT COURTS
INTERPRET THE
"INTENT TO DEFRAUD"
PROVISION OF THE
FEDERAL ODOMETER ACT
TO REQUIRE MORE THAN
MERE NEGLIGENCE
In 1972, Congress passed the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act ("Odometer
Act" or "the Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1990 (1982
and Supp.V 1987). The Act prohibits tampering
with car odometers and establishes safeguards
for the protection of consumers. In two recent
decisions, the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits interpreted
the "intent to defraud" provision of the Act. In
Jones v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co., 848 F.2d
803 (7th Cir. 1988), the court held that a car dealer's mere negligence in failing to ascertain
whether an odometer reading was accurate was
insufficient to constitute intent to defraud pursuant to the Act. In Van Praag v. Columbia Classics Corp., 849 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1988), the court
held that conflicting testimony regarding a
dealer's intent to give a false odometer statement presented a question for the jury.
Jones v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co.
In July 1984, Edward Jones purchased a 1979
Eldorado Biarritz from Hanley Dawson Cadillac
Company ("Hanley Dawson"). Section 1988 of
the Odometer Act requires a dealer to disclose
mileage information to the purchaser. Hanley
Dawson's salesman filled out an odometer statement certifying that the mileage on Mr. Jones'
car was 46,016 miles.
Hanley Dawson had previously purchased the
car from Tom's Used Cars ("Tom's"). At the time
of the purchase from Tom's, the car had an
odometer mileage statement of 48,964 miles.
When Tom's had purchased the car from an auction several months earlier it had a mileage
statement of 65,198 miles. The actual mileage on
the car at the time Tom's purchased it was more
than 95,000 miles.

When Hanley Dawson purchased the car from
Tom's, it performed a routine inspection for
mechanical defects and checked the vehicle's
safety devices. Pursuant to its regular practice,
Hanley Dawson did not inspect the area under
the dashboard, nor did it inspect the odometer
other than to determine if it was operating. Hanley Dawson routinely relies upon the accuracy
of the previous owner's odometer statement.
Although Mr. Jones had the car repaired five
times, mechanics never reported any problem
with the odometer reading. After Mr. Jones had
driven the car almost 20,000 miles, he received a
notice from the state of Michigan, where the car
previously had been titled. This notice stated
that the car's odometer statements were inconsistent. Mr. Jones filed an action against Hanley
Dawson and Tom's in federal court alleging violations of the Odometer Act. The court entered
a default judgment against Tom's for failing to
appear. Mr. Jones and Hanley Dawson subsequently agreed to proceed before a magistrate
and to the entry of judgment by a magistrate
pursuant to federal statute.
Magistrate's Decision: Liability if Failure to
Exercise Reasonable Care
At trial before the magistrate, an odometer
specialist testified that upon removing the dashboard he noticed that a turn signal lens was
missing. According to the specialist, the turn
signal lens could be dislodged only after one
removes the dashboard. Consequently, the specialist testified that someone had tampered with
the odometer, but that he was uncertain whether
that person had rolled back the odometer. The
magistrate determined that it was permissible to
infer that the colored turn signal lens was missing when Mr. Jones purchased the vehicle, noting that the lens could have been dislodged only
if the dashboard were removed and that the
dashboard clearly had not been removed during
the period Mr. Jones owned the car.
The magistrate concluded that a dealer is liable to the purchaser under the Odometer Act if
the dealer sells a car with an inaccurate mileage
statement and if the dealer acts with intent to
defraud. Intent to defraud exists if the dealer

acts with "recklessness, gross negligence, or
with constructive knowledge of an inaccuracy
based on a failure to exercise reasonable care."
848 F.2d at 805. The magistrate concluded that
Hanley Dawson had an affirmative duty to use
reasonable care to protect the purchaser, and
that this duty extended to employing odometer
experts or to training mechanics to check for
obvious signs of odometer tampering. The magistrate ruled that because Hanley Dawson had
failed to exercise reasonable care, it was liable
under the Odometer Act. Hanley Dawson appealed, alleging that the magistrate had employed an improper standard of liability and that
the language of the Act did not require a dealer
to employ an odometer expert in order to avoid
liability.
Seventh Circuit Analysis: Mere Negligence
Insufficient to Impose Civil Liability
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed the magistrate's ruling,
holding that the Act did not place on car dealers
an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care.
In interpreting the Act, the court noted that the
magistrate had relied upon a Senate Report
accompanying the Act when it was passed. The
magistrate had read a passage in the Report to
require that a failure to exercise reasonable care
could constitute the basis for civil liability. The
court disagreed with the magistrate's interpretation of this passage, explaining that it applies
only to § 1988 of the Act. Section 1988 of the Act
requires a dealer to disclose the mileage registered on the vehicle's odometer as well as the
actual mileage of the vehicle if it is different
from the odometer reading. Section 1989, on the
other hand, expressly requires that an intent to
defraud be present before civil damages may be
imposed. The court held that the plain meaning
of this language is that negligence is insufficient
to impose civil liability under the Odometer Act.
Because, at most, Hanley Dawson was negligent
in failing to investigate the missing turn signal
lens, the court held Hanley Dawson was not
liable to Mr. Jones.
Van Praag v. Columbia Classics Corp.
In March 1981, Sam Schwartz purchased a
1969 Mercedes Benz Model 600 from Monica
Petricek. Schwartz was then president and sole

stockholder of Columbia Classics Corporation
("Columbia"), a corporation which buys and
sells special interest automobiles. At the time of

purchase, the car's odometer read 8,200 miles. In
February 1982, Columbia sold the car to Kirkwood Classic Motorcars ("Kirkwood"), who in
turn sold the car to James Van Praag in April of
the same year. Kirkwood represented to Mr. Van
Praag that the mileage was 11,500 miles. Soon
after the purchase, Mr. Van Praag began to have
mechanical problems with the car and he became suspicious of the reported mileage. After
contacting several Mercedes distributors and
dealerships, Mr. Van Praag learned that the
actual mileage of the car was in excess of 105,000
miles.
Mr. Van Praag first filed an action against Kirkwood and Columbia in state court but the action
was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction
over Columbia. Mr. Van Praag then filed the
same complaint in federal court. He subsequently dismissed his action against Kirkwood,
but proceeded to trial against Columbia. The
jury returned a verdict against Columbia for
$10,000 and the district court awarded treble
damages pursuant to § 1989 of the Odometer
Act. Columbia moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court denied the motion, and Columbia appealed.
Eighth Circuit Analysis: Evidence Sufficient to
Support a Finding of Intent to Defraud
On appeal, Columbia raised five points of
error, each of which the Eighth Circuit rejected.
The court held that Columbia's motion for
summary judgment based on a lack of personal
jurisdiction, as well as its motion for a directed
verdict based on whether Mr. Van Praag was the
real party in interest, had been properly denied.
In addition, the court held that Mr. Van Praag
had filed his action within the appropriate time
period, and that the trial court had properly
allowed unsigned depositions of the car's prior
owners to be admitted into evidence.
In its final point of error, Columbia argued
that Mr. Van Praag failed to make a sufficient
case under the Odometer Act for two reasons.
First, Mr. Van Praag had failed to establish that
Columbia had an intent to defraud, as required
by § 1989 of the Odometer Act. Second, Colum(continued on page 74)
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bia also argued that the trial court improperly
instructed the jury regarding the reasonableness
of Mr. Van Praag's reliance on the false odometer
statement.
The Eighth Circuit held that the evidence was
sufficient for the jury to find that Columbia
acted with an intent to defraud by "knowingly,
recklessly, or with gross negligence [giving] a
false odometer statement." 849 F.2d. at 1110. In
her deposition, Monica Petricek stated that
when she sold the car to Columbia, the company's president gave her a blank odometer
statement to sign. They never discussed the car's
mileage. In contrast, Columbia claimed that the
parties filled out the mileage statement together.
The court noted that when there is conflicting
testimony regarding a material issue, such as the

intent to defraud, then the court may not grant a
motion for a directed verdict. Such a factual
conflict must be resolved by the jury.
The court also held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that Mr. Van Praag exercised a reasonable degree of care in relying on
Columbia's odometer statement. Columbia had
maintained that Mr. Van Praag's reliance on the
odometer statement was not reasonable because Mr. Van Praag isan expert on classical cars.
The court disagreed, explaining that the jury was
the appropriate body to decide this issue and
that it possessed sufficient facts from which to
make this determination. The court affirmed the
judgment of the district court.
Catherine M. Crisham

FIRST CIRCUIT HOLDS
BRAZILIAN MANUFACTURER
AND SALES REPRESENTATIVE
LIABLE FOR DEFECTIVE
PRESSURE COOKERS SOLD IN
PUERTO RICO

as pressure builds to prevent the cooker from
exploding. The second is a "fusible seal" in the
cooker's handle which is designed to melt if the
pressure within the cooker becomes too high.
When the fusible seal melts, a hole is created
which lets the excess steam escape. Alcan/Brasil
designed the "fusible seal" to melt when the
pressure inside the cooker isapproximately four
times the maximum operating pressure. Alcan/
Brasil also designed the cooker to be opened by
a user applying 25 pounds of force to the handle
on the lid, even when the pressure inside the
cooker is dangerously high. Underwriters' Laboratories specifications state that a pressure
cooker's lid should require 100 pounds of force
to be opened when the pressure inside the
cooker reaches a dangerous level. Moreover,
the specifications state that the "fusible seal"
should melt at twice the maximum operating
pressure rather than four times the maximum
operating pressure.
Three plaintiffs were injured by Alcan/Brasil
pressure cookers. Lercy Benitez Allende was
burned when the contents of the cooker flew
out as she removed the lid. Ramonita Garcia
Andino and Carmen Cruz Diaz were injured
when their Rochedo cookers exploded spontaneously, causing the lids and heated contents
to fly from the pots and strike them. All three

In Benitez-Allende v.Alcan Aluminio do Brasil,
S.A., 857 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 1135 (1989), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district
court's assertion of jurisdiction over a Brazilian
manufacturer of defective pressure cookers. The
court also held that the jury's findings of strict
liability against the manufacturer and the manufacturer's sales representative in Puerto Rico
were supported by the weight of the evidence.
Background
Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A. ("Alcan/Brasil")
manufactures the Rochedo pressure cooker in
Brazil and distributes it in large quantities in the
United States. The cooker operates by sealing
food and water inside a pot with a tight-fitting
lid. When the water inside the pot is heated, it
turns to steam, creating the pressure which
cooks the food. There are two safety devices on
the Rochedo cooker. The first is an escape valve
in the lid that, during normal use, releases steam

